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NOTES
Administrative Law: Primary Jurisdiction in
Stipe v. Theus?
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Stipe v. Theus' held that a pooled
mineral owner was entitled to a stay of district court proceedings until the
Corporation Commission disposed of the owner's application to determine
proper cost of a well.' The stayed proceeding was an action brought on an
open account by an oil and gas unit operator against a pooled mineral owner.
The pooled owner had elected to participate by paying his proportionate
share of drilling cost but later refused to pay the cost as invoiced.,
The justices in Stipe found that both the Corporation Commission and
the district court had authority "to determine the disputed issue, i.e., what
are [sic] the reasonable and proper cost?" 4 The court considered this to be,
however, "lain intolerable conflict of jurisdiction.., and only one tribunal
should make the determination. '"s The Commission, the justices held, should
be that tribunal.' In support of its conclusion, the court noted that the Com-
mission had retained jurisdiction of the issue of cost in its pooling order.
7
However, the conclusion reached in Stipe appears to have been based on an
analogy to the concept of priority, 8 even though the parties were requested to
provide supplemental briefs on the issue of primary jurisdiction. 9 The pur-
pose of this note is to explore the reasoning of this decision and its relation to
the concept of primary jurisdiction.
The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Primary jurisdiction was conceived in the federal courts'0 in an effort
to give effect to congressional legislation creating administrative agencies,
603 P.2d 347 (Okla. 1979).
Id. at 349.
Id. at 347.
Id. The Corporation Commission has jurisdiction under 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e)
(Supp. 1980), and the district court's jurisdiction is from OKLA. CONST. art. 7 § 7.
1 Stipe v. Theus, 603 P.2d 347, 349 (Okla. 1979).
6 Id.
7Id.
* Id. at 349. The concept of priority is the procedure to determine which tribunal will
decide matters brought in multiple tribunals with concurrent jurisdiction. 20 Am. JUR. 2d Courts
§ 138 (1965).
1 Respondents' Briefs on Primary Jurisdiction; Response Brief, made available to
author for inspection.
," United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); Far East Conference v.
United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); Thompson v. Texas Mex. Ry., 328 U.S. 134 (1946); General
American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422 (1940); Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
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and some scholars would add, to protect the jurisdiction of the then budding
Interstate Commerce Commission." Although primary jurisdiction has been
defined and explained in a number of ways,' 2 the United States Supreme
Court has succinctly stated the doctrine's central idea:
[Primary jurisdiction] applies where a claim is originally cognizable in
the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim re-
quires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have
been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in
such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its views."
There are two predominant reasons for the doctrine of primary jurisdiction:
to take advantage of administrative expertise and to attain uniformity and ef-
ficiency in regulation."' Other reasons for applying primary jurisdiction in-
' Botein, Primary Jurisdiction: The Need for Better Court/Agency Interaction, 29
RUTGERS L. REv. 867, 879 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Botein].
2 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE ch.19 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAvis]; 2
F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 561-70 (1965) [hereinafter cited as COOPER]; Jaffe,
Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. Rv. 1037 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe]; Kestenbaum,
Primary Jurisdiction to Decide Antitrust Jurisdiction: A Practical Approach to the Allocation of
Functions, 55 GEo. L.J. 812 (1967); Davis, Primary Jurisdiction: Effect of Administrative
Remedies in the Jurisdiction of Courts, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1251 (1937) [hereinafter cited as
Davis]. Although these and many more articles discuss primary jurisdiction, little uniformity as
to its nature and extent seems to exist. For a discussion of the doctrine in Oklahoma, see Merrill,
Compulsory Unitization and Individual Interest: Judicial or Administrative Jurisdiction? 8
OKLA. L. REv. 389 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Merrill].
11 United States v. Western Pac. Ry., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956). For a unique analysis of
primary jurisdiction, see Botein, supra note 11. To understand primary jurisdiction fully a sug-
gestion has been made that the doctrine be divided into categories. Two of the categories, the
ones relevant to the analysis of this paper, are true primary jurisdiction and exclusive primary
jurisdiction. Exclusive primary jurisdiction exists where the legislature has placed the initial
determination of the particular issue or aspect of law exclusively in the hands of a particular
agency. See DAviS, supra note 12, at § 19.09, and COOPER, supra note 12, at 569. True primary
jurisdiction exists where the court and the agency have concurrent jurisdiction, but certain fac-
tors make it more desirable for the agency to make the initial determination of the issue. This
analysis is taken from Botein, supra note 11, where primary jurisdiction is broken down into
four doctrines: exclusive primary jurisdiction, true primary jurisdiction, statutory exemption,
and agency immunization. Some scholars decline to categorize primary jurisdiction in this man-
ner, instead regarding primary jurisdiction as essentially applying where exclusive jurisdiction
rests with the agency and true primary jurisdiction as only an aberration. Jaffe, supra note 12, at
1059. Professor Merrill designates primary jurisdiction as primary administrative jurisdiction
and limits it to issues "committed" to the agency. Merrill, supra note 12, at 393. He alludes,
however, to the possibility of true primary jurisdiction: "There might exist machinery by which
the administrative process could be bromight to bear to the solution of these controversies and yet
the matter might lie outside the primary administrative jurisdiction." Id. at 404.
True primary jurisdiction and exclusive primary jurisdiction are closely related to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. They differ from the exhaustion doctrine in
that they apply to determine which tribunal will make the initial determination, and the exhaus-
tion doctrine applies where the agency has already been found to be the correct tribunal to deter-
mine the issue initially if not exclusively. See also Merrill, supra, at 393.
" COOPER, supra note 12, at 563; Merrill, supra note 12, at 404. See also Chicago R. I.
& P. Ry. v. Brown, 232 P. 43 (Okla. 1924).
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clude (1) the elimination of conflict between branches of government; (2) the
speedier action of administrative agencies; (3) overcrowded court dockets; (4)
the responsiveness of the agency to public will; (5) more competent relief
available through the agency; and (6) the intolerance of the legal system to
different results from different forums.'" These justifications explain the
need for the application of the doctrine.'
6
In Central States Power & Light Corp. v. Thompson,'7 for example,
the issue of whether a purchaser of natural gas was to be charged under the
industrial or domestic rate was found to be for the sole determination of the
district court. The determination was held to be outside the jurisdiction of
the Corporation Commission (i.e., the court refused to find any jurisdiction
in the Commission) because a private dispute, not a matter of public con-
cern, was involved."s Kenneth Culp Davis has criticized the private-public
distinction as "probably not susceptible of development into a workable
guide, for nearly all problems affected by the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion have both public and private aspects in varying proportions. '
Another criticism of this rationale is that a series of private disputes may
upset uniformity of regulation, as individual courts would make decisions
without the technical background of the agency.2 0 The advisability of the
distinction applied in Central States is particularly questionable with regard
to cases before the Corporation Commission concerning regulation of the oil
and gas industry. A great deal of this regulation involves relationships be-
tween private parties arising out of pooling and unitization orders.2' In this
area, the Commission has statutory authority to proceed; 22 however, a
dispute between such private parties arguably could be classified as a
"private dispute" within the meaning of the term as used by the court in
Central States. As the Commission is a body with limited jurisdiction, 2 the
extent of its jurisdiction (as well as its relation to the jurisdiction of the
" Bctein, supra note 11, at 879-83. These reasons apply to both true primary jurisdiction
and exclusive primary jurisdiction. The difference in the two concepts is that exclusive primary
jurisdiction requires that the agency have exclusive jurisdiction.
16 These justifications have been criticized but the criticism does not apply to the facts
here. Botein, supra note 11, at 878-84.
', 58 P.2d 868 (Okla. 1936).
Id.
" DAivis, supra note 12, at § 19.08. See also Merrill, supra note 12, at 405-406, in which
Merrill doubts that Central States reflects the true doctrine in Oklahoma. He refers to Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Carter, 93 Okla. 269, 220 P. 635 (1923). This conclusion is supported by later
cases, especially those arising under 52 OKLA. STAT. §§ 87.1(e) and 287 (Supp. 1980), dealing
with pooling and unitization orders of the Corporation Commission which affect the rights of
private parties. Continental Tel. Co. of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Hunter, 590 P.2d 667 (Okla. 1979);
Lear Pet. Corp. v. Seneca Oil Co., 590 P.2d 670 (Okla. 1979).
20 Davis, supra note 12, at 1259-60.
21 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1980), and § 287 (1971).
22 Id. See also Merrill, supra note 12.
23 Lear Pet. Corp. v. Seneca Oil Co., 590 P.2d 670 (Okla. 1979); Burmah Oil & Gas Co.
v. Corporation Comm'n, 541 P.2d 835 (Okla. 1975); Southern Union Prod. Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n, 465 P.2d 454 (Okla. 1970); Gulf Oil Corp. v. State, 360 P.2d 933 (Okla. 1961).
[Vol. 34
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district court) would seem appropriate for application of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.
A Closer Look at Stipe
The original action was brought in district court on an open account
concerning the invoicing of cost by Davis, the operator of an oil and gas
unit. Davis, the plaintiff, sued Stipe, a pooled mineral owner, to collect
Stipe's proportionate share of cost. The operator did not seek the lien al-
lowed by statute against Stipe's mineral interest because the well was allegedly
marginal, and such relief would not allow the operator to recover his cost.24
The defendant sought to dismiss the action, contending that the Commission
had exclusive jurisdiction to determine reasonable cost. The motion to
dismiss was overruled. The defendant then filed an application with the
Commission (in the same cause in which the pooling order had been issued
setting forth the well cost) to determine the reasonableness of the invoiced
cost. The Commission had retained jurisdiction of the issue of cost, as is its
normal procedure in pooling orders establishing units and determining the
relationships between parties. The defendant also filed a motion in district
court to stay its proceedings. The stay was overruled. An original action was
then brought by defendant in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma seeking a writ
of prohibition against the district court. The supreme court denied the writ
but stayed the district court proceeding until a determination of the reason-
able cost had been made by the Commission pursuant to the defendant's ap-
plication.s The basis of the decision was not stated to be primary jurisdiction
but rather a variation of the concept of priority.
In Oklahoma, the Corporation Commission has the exclusive authority
to regulate not only the conservation of oil and gas but also the drilling and
operation of oil and gas wells. 6 Special knowledge and familiarity with the
regulated area, terminology, and practices of the industry have been
developed by the Commission. Standards have been developed to decide
issues frequently considered. One such issue is well cost; the Commission is
required to make provision for the payment of well cost and has authority to
determine proper cost in the event of a dispute. 27 The cost of a well involves
matters of a technical nature. Although district courts must determine issues
involving technical matters, these tribunals do not handle disputes involving
the cost of a well as frequently as does the Commission. One can argue,
therefore, that the Commission has the expertise in this particular area-the
first reason for the application of primary jurisdiction.
The second reason underlying the concept is raised by the facts of the
Stipe case. Uniformity and efficiency of administrative regulation of the oil
24 Stipe v. Theus, 603 P.2d 347 (Okla. 1979).
25 Id.
26 17 OKLA. STAT. § 52 (1971).
27 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1980).
19811
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and gas industry can be better maintained if consistent standards are applied
to determine proper well cost. Application of varying standards by different
forums would multiply disputes and encourage forum shopping by litigants
seeking "their standards." This concern also directs attention to another
basis of primary jurisdiction, that is, "the intolerance of the legal system for
different results from different forums.""8 The Commission, by determining
proper cost on a regular basis,29 has developed standards as to what costs are
necessary and proper. Speedier and more competent relief30 would seem,
therefore, to result and to provide an argument for favoring the application
of primary jurisdiction to this area of Corporation Commission regulation.
Overcrowded court dockets generally are not the problem in Oklahoma
courts that they are in federal courts. Any savings in time, however, resulting
from not requiring an agency determination but only a "judicial" presenta-
tion of evidence and instructions would be lost in the necessity of instructing
the judge and jury in the terminology and practice of the industry sufficient
for them to decide the issue of proper cost.3 The responsiveness of the agency
to the public will, another reason for primary jurisdiction, is evident in the
possible danger of an agency being "captured" by the industry. This poten-
tial in administrative regulation is a positive rather than a negative considera-
tion for applying primary jurisdiction to the issue of well cost. The Commis-
sion is more likely than a district court to see the practicality and overall ef-
fect of its decision. Also, both parties are in the industry or are familiar with
it, and the public interest in the determination of well cost is minimal.
In addition, the same relief need not be available from the agency as
from the court for primary jurisdiction to be applied so as to place the issue
before the agency. The doctrine only states that the agency is a better forum
to decide the particular issue. Other issues, as well as any relief sought, may
be left to a competent court. The court in Stipe, notwithstanding, declined to
use primary jurisdiction, and chose to decide the jurisdictional dispute by us-
ing a kind of "priority" rationale. Under a strict application of the concept
of priority, however, the same relief must be sought in both forums.3 2 As the
Commission could not grant the relief sought by the plaintiff in Stipe, a
literal application of the concept of priority was not possible.2
23 See text accompanying note 15, infra.
29 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1980).
30 "More competent relief" as used herein refers to a more thorough understanding of
the dispute and not to the types of remedies available.
11 A criticism of primary jurisdiction is that it denies a party his constitutional right to a
trial by jury. This would be-an arguable criticism of exclusive jurisdiction but it would not apply
with as much weight to true primary jurisdiction. See Atlas Roof Co. v. OSHA, 43 U.S. 442
(1977).
" The concept of priority also requires concurrent jurisdiction, the same parties, and the
same subject matter. Because agencies and courts rarely have the same power to grant relief, the
concept is rarely applicable when the dispute concerns the question of jurisdiction between a
court and an agency. 20 AM. JUR. 2d Courts § 128 (1965).
3, Priority is generally not applied to a jurisdictional conflict between a court and an
agency. The exception has been where the issue was jurisdiction. See Scott v. Industrial Accid.
[Vol. 34
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What then is the basis of the decision in Stipe? The court held that as
the Corporation Commission had retained jurisdiction of the issue of cost,
the defendant mineral owner had acquired a right to a determination of this
issue by the Commission. The justices do not seem to rely on any designated
concept for this holding and merely state that the petitioner has certain
rights, citing Autry v. District Court." In that case the concept of priority
was not applied because different relief was sought in the two courts in-
volved. In one court a wife sought separate maintenance and in a second
court the husband sought a divorce. The holding in Autry was that the sec-
ond court could not prevent the wife from enforcing the rights that might
have accrued from the first court's decision.35 In Stipe the court also held
that the petitioner had certain rights, "and one of these is the right for the
Commission to determine proper cost in the event of a dispute. Sec. 87.1(e)
grants this right and the pooling order specifically followed the statute."
'3 6
The right of a party to have an agency determine an issue peculiarly within its
competence has been cited by one scholar as an aspect of primary jurisdic-
tion .
7
As demonstrated, an argument can be made that the court in Stipe was
actually applying the concept of primary jurisdiction. Even though the opin-
ion suggests that the decision is based on the retained jurisdiction of the
Commission, this rationale is not convincing because the Commission may
not give complete relief. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction provides a bet-
ter explanation for the result in the case. It requires a determination of an
issue by an agency before the court proceeding continues in order to allow
the judiciary and parties to take full advantage of the expertise and ex-
perience of the agency,38 and to maintain the efficiency and uniformity of the
administrative regulation.
Effect of the Adoption of Primary Jurisdiction
The court in Stipe declined to discuss the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion or to analyze the case by the principles of the concept. This should not,
however, prevent the use of this case as persuasive authority for the applica-
tion of the concept to similar conflicts between the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission and the jurisdiction of the district court because the case, in effect,
applied the doctrine.
The adoption of a broader concept of primary jurisdiction would
benefit the courts by allowing them to take advantage of a body having ex-
Comm'n, 46 Cal. 2d 76, 293 P.2d 18 (1956) and Proffitt v. J.G. Watts Constr. Co., 370 P.2d
878, 883 (Mont. 1962), which distinguishes Scott.
11 459 P.2d 865 (Okla. 1969).
35 Id.
36 Stipe v. Theus, 603 P.2d 347, 349 (Okla. 1979).
3" Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1039.
1, Davis considers the taking of full advantage of an agency's experience and skill a




perience and knowledge of the matters involved. The Corporation Commis-
sion, in this instance, would be benefited by maintaining consistent standards
and efficient regulation of the industry. The oil and gas industry would be
greatly aided as regulated persons would know which decision maker is to
make the initial determination of the issue. A decision by the Corporation
Commission would in many cases deter any further action in the courts.
In cases like Stipe, where a well is marginal, a subsequent action might
have to be brought in district court to effect a remedy, i.e., the Commission
may not award a money judgment;39 however, the Commission would
already have determined proper cost. Although under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, a court would not have to give the finding of the agency
the same weight afforded a judgment of another court, ° under statute the
order of the Corporation Commission in settling a dispute to determine prop-
er cost is appealable to the state supreme court,4 ' and therefore, not
reviewable by the district court. The Corporation Commission's findings
would be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. 12 In addition, parties
bringing cases in district court without a prior determination of the issue of
cost by the Commission would know that the issue would be referred to the
Commission. Forum shopping would thus be eliminated.
Conclusion
Considering the discussion above, one has to inquire, "Why did the
Oklahoma Supreme Court not use the concept of primary jurisdiction?" At
least two explanations are possible. The court may have been concerned that
an application of the concept would imply that the Corporation Commission
had exclusive jurisdiction to determine proper cost. This implication,
however, was explicitly disallowed by the court. Moreover, it is not consis-
tent with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 3 A second explanation may be
a hesitancy to change the law if another rationale suffices. As indicated,
" Southern Union Prod. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 465 P.2d 454 (Okla. 1970).
," Botein, supra note 11, at 889; DAVIS, supra note 12, at § 19.07.
60-3 P.2d 347, 348 (Okla. 1979).
, Lear Pet. Corp. v. Seneca Oil Co., 590 P.2d 670 (Okla. 1979).
,3 Stipe v. Theus, 603 P.2d 347, 348 n.4 (Okla. 1979). It is arguable that the Corporation
Commission was given exclusive jurisdiction to determine well cost by 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e)
(Supp. 1980). The constitutional provisions creating the Commission, OKLA. CONST. art 9, §§ 19,
35, and granting the legislature power to increase the authority of the Commission, and the
enactment of 17 OKLA. Si-AT. § 52 (1971), granting the Commission exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the conservation and production of oil and gas pursuant to art. 9 § 35 of the OKLA.
CONST. were an explicit grant of exclusive jurisdiction which, with the enactment of 52 OKLA.
SrAT. § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1980), gave the Commission exclusive authority to determine well cost.
The Court in Stipe held this not to be a grant of exclusive jurisdiction as to limit the unlimited
original jurisdiction of the district court created by OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 7. See also Oklahoma
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 543 P.2d 546 (Okla. 1975). Therefore, only concur-
rent jurisdiction exists. Merrill points out that the court has indicated in another case that such a
grant of exclusive jurisdiction would be unconstitutional, but goes on to say that the constitu-
tional theory of the case so holding is vague. Merrill, supra note 12, at 405 n.85.
[Vol. 34
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